Guest – The Epicurean Cure A celebration of thinking – rigorously, critically, and enthusiastically – about and through the media we love. 2022-08-30T13:23:27Z https://www.epicureancure.com/feed/atom/ WordPress Guest <![CDATA[Taken as a Genre]]> https://www.epicureancure.com/?p=885 2022-08-30T13:23:27Z 2022-08-30T13:23:26Z As someone born in the late 80s, I came of age with the new millennium. This meant, for me and many others, having just enough familiarity with the world of the 90s to recognize the utter madness of the post-9/11 period. Even from outside the United States I could see optimism giving way to a mix of terror and bloodlust. The 90s new economy was supposed to promise a world where war was an anachronism (though the peace always had its discontents). Instead, political and popular culture became a constant torrent of demands for violence. “We” were at war now, and the “homeland” needed to be defended. The bloodlust of the first day – my main memory of September 11 2001 itself is a man leaning out his car to be interviewed on TV demanding a nuclear strike against a “them” he can’t identify as anything more than Middle Eastern – escalated into two wars and a wartime fervour that didn’t abate for almost a decade.

No film captures this cacophonous, almost desperate violence quite like Pierre Morel’s Taken (2008). A film that turned Liam Neeson from a serious dramatic actor into America’s favourite murder-dad. What I want to do here is look at one of Taken’s legacies. Specifically, I want to argue that Taken can be understood as a genre unto itself.

What does this mean, to say Taken is a genre? For starters, genres are ways we categorize works of art. Genres can be broad, like comedy or sci-fi. They can be more specific, like a ‘casino crime caper’ or ‘dystopian teenage romance’. In each case, what makes genres ‘genres’ is that these categories guide both creation and interpretation.[1] So a movie being a comedy means both that the people making it were using the idea of “comedy” to guide their decisions, and the people watching it were using the idea of “comedy” to appreciate it. To say Taken is a genre, then, means that there are movies which can be understood as “Takens”. To appreciate these movies, it’s not enough to understand that they share features with Taken, but to view them as “a Taken.”

Later I’ll go over three particular Takens but first we need to set up just what a Taken is. If it’s a genre, what are its distinctive features? What does it take to be a Taken?

Taken

Movie poster for Taken

Let’s start with the plot, which is most famous for revolving around Liam Neeson as murder-dad Bryan Mills. Mills starts the movie as an ex Green Beret and CIA officer who has been reduced to working security because nobody needs him anymore; his wife has left him for another man and his daughter thinks he’s a loser. On a trip to Paris, his daughter and her friend are kidnapped by vaguely-ethnic Albanian gangsters who plan to sell them into slavery. Mills delivers his famous monologue over the phone – “I will find you, and I will kill you” – and murders his way across Paris until he saves his daughter from a sheik straight out of Disney’s Aladdin. He wins back his daughter’s adoration, and gets her music lessons with the pop star he was bodyguarding for at the start of the movie.

But, of course, a movie is more than its plot. So let’s look at what makes this such a post-9/11 movie. Plenty is obvious on the surface: the special forces super soldier kicking into action to save his daughter from the ambiguously Middle Eastern bad guys (and doing so without the help of the hapless French). There’s more to it, though. As Susan Faludi noted in The Terror Dream, the American reaction to 9/11 involved trying to reinforce a particular kind of gender ideal. 9/11 was understood as a violation of the American domicile: the household inhabited by mother, father, and 2.3 children.

In reaction to this “violated domicile,” there was a cultural move to not just restore men to the forefront but restore the “paterfamilias”, the father-protector of the family who led and provided for the domicile. As Faludi notes, news pundits heralded 9/11 as an outright refutation of feminism: women in leadership had displaced (or worse) the manly men who protected America, and this led to America being attacked.[2] Donald Rumsfeld heralded the return of “heroes,” great men who would not just defend the US but restore its (gendered) order.[3] America’s opinion-makers agreed: the male id needed to be unleashed so that men could re-take their position as leaders and defenders of the family order.[4]

All of this is not just found in Taken, but is essential to making it what it is. Mills, the ex-special forces guy, has been left adrift after his skills were no longer needed in the 90s peace. His ex-wife has decided that he’s a relic and left him for a soft, suburban man. The vaguely-ethnic bad guys upset the domicile by kidnapping his daughter; the fight is ultimately over control of his daughter, with the looming threat of her being sold as a sex slave to the Sheik. The movie ends, of course, with Mills heroically killing all the bad guys, winning back his daughter, and restoring the domicile.

Looking at Taken as a genre, then, isn’t just about the plot. It’s about Taken as a story of restoring order to a violated domicile by setting out into a dangerous and foreign world. And it’s all of that as part of the US’ collective emotional response to 9/11.

What I want to do now is look at three movies – The Grey, John Wick, and Pig – which show some of the interesting directions Takens have gone. These are far from the only instances, but they show the different directions the genre can go. And, from afar, can even show how the US has culturally developed since 9/11.

The Grey

Liam Neeson runs from wolves in The Grey

The place to start is with The Grey, a movie released shortly enough after Taken that it not only starred Liam Neeson but was marketed as “Taken with wolves.” Neeson plays John Ottway, a hunter mourning the death of his wife, and who has to chaperone survivors to safety after their small plane crashes in the Alaskan wilderness. Their mission is made more difficult by the fact that they are pursued by a pack of hungry wolves.

There are some obvious differences, of course – here Ottway is leading a group of people, not retrieving his daughter – but the similarities are significant. Ottway’s character is defined by the tragic shattering of the domicile and he plays the paterfamilias-protector character going through a dangerous foreign land (in this case the wilderness). His motivation is to restore the domicile and playing the paterfamilias in the woods is his way of achieving that.

Where Taken is a glorious story of revenge and restoration, The Grey confronts the absurdity of death. Each human has a corresponding wolf, and the humans’ deaths are absurd and meaningless. The characters die when urinating, falling, slipping near a river. And each of these tragedies are, importantly, irreversible. Ottway’s character arc is about coming to terms with the meaninglessness of his wife’s death, and accepting that there really is nothing he can do.

In the acceptance of tragedy, it becomes clear how The Grey stands relative to Taken. The Grey takes the tragic shock of 9/11 and begins the process of reckoning with the fact that there maybe isn’t any greater justice to be had, and there’s no way to put back together what was broken. There’s no saving and reuniting the family; Ottway’s wife is dead and there’s nothing he can do about that. This is what makes The Grey a 'Taken', then. Not that it’s “Taken with wolves”, but because it takes the story, themes, and context of Taken, and uses them to make a new movie that has to be understood in the context of the original.

John Wick

Keanu Reeves as John Wick holds a small dog

The next Taken I want to look at has Keanu Reeves as the titular Wick, and came deep into the Obama era.

The plot is that Wick is a former super assassin who retired to marry and settle down. The story starts shortly after his wife has died; she had bought him a dog by which to remember her. A gang of criminals kills the dog while stealing Wick’s car, causing Wick to (literally) dig up his old assassins’ tools and go on a mission of revenge through an elaborately-imagined criminal underworld. This story is pointedly psychological, and is frequently read as a return to addiction. Wick got clean for his wife, and now he’s relapsing. So what makes this a Taken?

For one, this is a story of Wick, the man of his house, going on a mission of revenge after his domicile is violated. The dog is presented as his last connection to his wife, so in killing it, the villains are not just invading Wick’s house but tearing apart the nuclear family. The dangerous foreign land in this movie is a fantastical criminal underworld, complete with gold coins, codes of honour, and secret institutions. And it is pointedly very dangerous: anyone and everyone could be a secret assassin.

But where Taken and The Grey are deeply interested in politics, John Wick represents a retreat from politics into the psychological. As Graeber argues in The Utopia of Rules, this was typical of many superhero movies of the era, where the personal becomes subordinate to the personal and psychological.[5] Taking The Dark Knight Rises as an example, Graeber notes how a story about a revolution in Gotham City – where Occupy-coded anarchist-terrorists take over the city and entomb the cops – is ultimately about Bruce Wayne the person learning to have healthy relationships with others.[6] Despite using political images, the movie is not actually interested in revolution or justice or any other part of politics. That’s all window dressing for Bruce Wayne delving into his psyche.

Similar to The Dark Knight Rises, the fantastical criminal underworld of John Wick is merely flavour for the character Wick’s personal journey. The bad guys are still vaguely ethnic, but there is no symbolism or any other importance to their ethnicity. There’s no real politics of the household, with the domicile instead representing Wick’s personal normalcy. The dog represents his own personal health more than it does any familial integrity: by the end of the movie the dog is replaced, the new dog indicating that he’s at peace once again.

John Wick, then, isn’t a response to Taken like The Grey is. Rather, it’s a Taken for its era. It’s what happens when Taken is removed from the extremely politically-conscious, post-9/11 period, and re-created in an era where a sufficient number of people were no longer really paying attention to politics. The political world is gone. The social world is gone. John Wick is a Taken where the conflict is entirely within the individual.

Pig

Man sits with pig

Pig gives us Nicolas Cage as Robin Feld, a grieving hermit. Like The Grey it confronts the inevitability of death, but moves from the context of 9/11 to climate change. It combines grieving what has been lost with grieving what will be lost.

Feld – at first just “Rob” – lives in a small shack in the Oregon woods with his truffle pig, where he trades truffles to a luxury foods supplier, Amir, for baking supplies. One night people break in and steal his pig; he teams up with Amir to head into the city to retrieve it.

We learn of Feld’s past as an elite chef, and the dark underbelly of the luxury restaurant world. While Pig keeps the revenge structure of the other Takens, as Feld moves through his old foes, he pointedly avoids taking revenge. This culminates in a ‘showdown’ with Amir’s father Darius – the pig thief – where Feld recreates a meal he had previously cooked for Darius and his wife.

While not a man of violence like Mills or Wick, Rob is still the paterfamilias of a broken home. His home has fallen apart through him losing his wife and now his pig. Both Portland and the restaurant scene play the role of the dangerous foreign land. Rob even has Wick’s secret stash, though for him it’s strategically stored luxury ingredients.

The story centres on grief. At the beginning of the film Feld tries and fails to listen to a recording his late wife made for him. Amir’s mother, Darius’s wife, is in a comatose state but neither Amir or Darius can fully let go. Rob and Amir talk about catastrophe – tidal waves and eruptions – and how there’s no way to escape them. At the end of the movie they have an exchange about how if they’d never gone to look for the titular pig, Rob could’ve lived out his life imagining the pig was still alive. “Maybe,” he says, “but she’d still be dead.”

As with The Grey, this is a story about a nuclear family that cannot be put back together. Feld’s wife is dead, his pig is dead; he goes by his old house and the persimmon tree is gone. But for Pig, these things were always transient.

In Pig, everything is transient. A meal, of course, is an experience which immediately disappears into the past. Feld counsels a luxury chef who has abandoned his dream of running an English pub: “Every day you wake up and there will be less of you.” The time he’s invested in his restaurant has been spent wrongly. Even cities are temporary, Portland doomed to be destroyed by tidal wave, earthquake and volcano.

But we have what we value, and memory lets us hold on to what we value. Feld is able to return to his wife’s cassette. The meal lets Darius not only remember his wife but return to the good that he had with her. Even the discussion about the end of Portland ends with a mutual vow between Rob and Amir:

“Well I’m not fucking moving to Seattle.”

“Fuck Seattle.”

In its focus on transience, Pig is very much a Taken for a world that has moved from terrorism to climate change as the foremost imagined threat. Feld’s pig was stolen, but the biggest threat of the movie is the persistent decay of time of passing. This is a world where everything is coming to an end, and the only thing you can do is salvage what good you can in the time you have.

The foreign world, too, is not dangerous in its potential to be harmful but in how it represents the wrong paths in life. Pursuing power, fame, and money as superficial signifiers of status instead of finding what’s truly valuable.

Looking at Taken as a genre, then, isn’t just about the plot. It’s about Taken as a story about restoring order to a violated domicile by setting out into a dangerous and foreign world.

These are just a few standout examples of Takens. They show the different direction the genre has gone. Regular Takens are still being made, even starring Liam Neeson.[7] The world, America especially, still loves its murder-dads murdering the family back together.

But looking at these examples gives us a way to understand (one) way the US has developed after 9/11. We begin with murdering the family back together, we move on to confronting the absurdity of death. With John Wick the story turns inwards, and lastly with Pig we get a connection to new political themes.

The transition of movies away from explicitly interrogating the meaning of 9/11 doesn’t mean that Taken is going to be left in the dust. There are still reasons to understand the US as a society reacting to 9/11. And, so long as that’s the case, there will be new Takens to be had.


[1] Stacie Friend, Fiction as a Genre, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 112/2 (2012), pp. 179-209.

[2] Susan Faludi, The Terror Dream, (New York, NY: Metropolitan Books, 2007), pp. 20-1.

[3] Faludi, pp. 46-47.

[4] Faludi, pp. 77-78.

[5] David Graeber, The Utopia of Rules, (Brooklyn, NY: Melville House, 2015), pp. 220-221.

[6] Graeber, pp. 222-223.

[7] Both The Ice Road and The Marksman were released in 2021.


References

  • Faludi, Susan. The Terror Dream: Fear and Fantasy in Post-9/11 America (New York, NY: Metropolitan Books, 2007).
  • Friend, Stacie. Fiction as a Genre, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 112/2 (2012), pp. 179-209.
  • Graeber, David. The Utopia of Rules: On Technology, Stupidity, and the Secret Joys of Bureaucracy (Brooklyn, NY: Melville House, 2015).

Further Reading

For more of the cultural influences that went in to Taken, nothing comes close to The Terror Dream by Faludi (see above). The book was actually published before Taken was released, so you can think of the movie as a successful prediction by Faludi.

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Guest <![CDATA[Dark Humour & Insipid Morality]]> https://www.epicureancure.com/?p=871 2021-12-09T21:34:11Z 2021-12-09T21:34:09Z The central conceit of The Suicide Squad (2021) is that an evil government bureaucrat has forced a bunch of villains to work together to save the world. The villains, of course, are reluctant and uncooperative but if they disobey the bureaucrat will press a button, killing the uncooperative villain instantly. The tone, offered by the advertising material, is one of dark comedy. Each character’s poster comes with the text “don’t get too attached,” telling us not only that any character could die at any time, but also that this possibility is part of the movie’s fun. We’re cheering for exploding heads. The trailer promotes the movie as being “from the horribly beautiful mind of James Gunn,” and promotional copy refers to him as “twisted.”

The Suicide Squad 2021 movie poster

The movie’s pre-credit scene certainly does what it can to live up to its advertisements. We are introduced to Savant, alone with a rubber ball in an open-air jail cell. A bird lands in his cell and, instead of sympathising with it, he instantly kills it with his ball. The camera lingers on the bird’s viscera. We are then introduced to the rest of the initial suicide squad, a bunch of brightly coloured dipshits posing in front of an American flag. They are sent off to invade and overthrow Corto Maltese, a loose analogy of Cuba and Venezuela, as the workers of the government office bet which squad member will die first. Upon arriving, the squad are instantly cornered and killed in increasingly ridiculous ways. Savant, horrified by his team’s collapse, turns and flees which causes the bureaucrat Waller to detonate the bomb inside his head. A bird flies down and picks at the stump where Savant’s head used to be. The blood spells out “Warner Brothers presents.” Dark Humour.

A dark comedy having a moral core is nothing surprising. After all, the audience needs some way to side with the protagonists, and the morally uglier a movie is the more we feel like there has to be some point to it. However, The Suicide Squad goes beyond just having a moral core; it has a moralistic one. And I think this is striking, that a movie that revels in the graphic deaths of its characters could also end up with the tone of Helen Lovejoy’s pleading to “please think of the children”. Now, we could just dismiss this as sloppy writing, as if Gunn went for a simple message and ended up with a simplistic one. But I want to suggest that there’s something interesting going on, and that there’s a deep connection between dark humour and insipid morality.

When I say a movie has “insipid morality,” what I mean is that it presents a moral message that is trite and simplistic; is the sort of thing that would be presented as obvious common sense; and is made stupidly. For The Suicide Squad that insipid morality is an obsession with the purity of children. Much of the core team are understood either as children or in relation to children. Both Polkadot Man and Ratcatcher II are explicitly framed as children whose powers were created by their parents. King Shark, a simple-minded man-eating shark god, is defended by Ratcatcher II for being infantile. Team leader Bloodsport is motivated by the desire to protect his daughter. And Peacemaker… well, John Cena has always had a talent for looking like an overgrown toddler.

The Suicide Squad goes beyond just having a moral core; it has a moralistic one.

Characters often state a motivation to protect children. Harley Quinn kills the president of Corto Maltese after he mentions killing children and she calls that a “red flag” for a toxic relationship. The soldier Rick Flag repeatedly shouts “they experimented on children” in righteous anger. The heroes talk about defending all the innocent children from the mind-slaving starfish. And the office secretary declares “all those people, John. Little kids,” after she incapacitates the evil bureaucrat with a golf club. These declarations of innocence and purity confer a sense of innocence and purity to the protagonists, then, since they were defined as children.

This sort of moral triteness would be a tonal clash with most movies, but it stands out particularly in the context of dark humour. This is because dark humour is interested in transgressing not just moral norms, but all good taste. Take Savant’s brief arc. He kills the bird (moral transgression) and then the camera lingers on the viscera (taste transgression). The movie invites the audience to laugh at him panicking, fleeing, and dying. His arc concludes with his corpse being eaten by a small bird. The humour inheres in the moral and aesthetic ugliness.

There’s a similar dynamic in the characterization of Polka-Dot Man. The original Polka-Dot Man was simply an eccentric who hid devices inside of polka dots on his suit. In The Suicide Squad, the character is infected with an interdimensional cancer virus which manifests in gigantic pulsing multicoloured pustules all over his body. The humour comes both from that being disgusting and the fact that it’s using cancer as the basis of the joke. Often, dark humour targets the very idea of the good, with death itself being the punchline. Polka-Dot Man is killed at his first happy moment, good guy rebels are killed because the protagonists were careless, and there is a repeated joke about Harley Quinn not even knowing who the supporting character Milton was even after he was killed in front of her.

Polka-Dot man with glowing pustules

That dark humour is centred not just on the transgression of norms but on the transgression of all norms is, I think, the source of why it can lead to moral insipidity. This is because transgressions create a problem for trustworthiness. What I want to do now is give a brief account of trustworthiness and explain how it gets undermined by dark humour. I’ll then show how insipid morality can be understood as an attempt to restore trustworthiness.

There are two ways to understand someone being trustworthy. The first is just that she is the sort of person who can be trusted.[1] This can mean we trust them in general, but usually trust is particular to certain specific things (“domains” in technical-speak). A stranger may seem trustworthy for me to ask them to keep an eye on my bag while I use the washroom, but I wouldn’t have them take care of my home while I’m away. Another way of understanding trustworthiness is through commitments: a trustworthy person is a person who meets her commitments.[2] These commitments are usually like promises, so if a trustworthy person says she is going to do something, you can count on her doing it.

In each case, trustworthiness seems to fundamentally involve doing what you say you’re going to do. And here is where humour can be a problem, because humour can often involve talking a lot of nonsense. It’s accepted that when you’re joking you don’t mean what you say, thus the phrase “I’m just joking.” The more you don’t mean what you say, the harder it is for me to count on you to do what you say you’re going to do. The more nonsense you talk, the less connection there is between what you say and what you do. The less connection there between what you say and what you do, the less I can take what you say to be an indication of what you’ll do.

Normally we only joke about certain things, and in certain circumstances. I’ll more readily talk about misfortunate befalling me than you, and while I might say anything at the pub I wouldn’t say the same thing in an important meeting. I think trustworthiness makes sense of this: the more likely it is to matter what I say, the less I talk nonsense. The point at which it begins to matter what I say can be understood as (one of the) boundaries of morality and good taste that dark humour transgresses. Remember that dark humour works not only by joking about things beyond morality and good taste, but that crossing those boundaries is central to the jokes themselves. This is to say that when you’re practicing dark humour, you’re talking a lot of nonsense.

Suicide Squad poster featuring Harley Quinn

This sort of nonsense speak in dark humour poses an additional problem. Normally, if you want to transition from speaking nonsense to speaking seriously, you do something to make clear that you’re now adhering to normal conversational rules. Maybe you change your posture and tone of voice, or maybe you just change topics to something you wouldn’t joke about. But with dark humour, these boundaries themselves are the targets of humour, and so they’re harder to use to make yourself seem serious. Just as turning words to nonsense makes it harder for those words to be taken seriously, turning conventions to nonsense makes it harder for those conventions to be taken seriously. And, as I mentioned earlier, dark humour often targets the very ideas of morality, goodness, and good taste. So not only are words and conventions reduced to nonsense, but so too is the very idea of the good.

If the very idea of morality seems like nonsense coming from you, how do you reestablish that you’re still a good person? Or, at least, not a bad one? If the worry is that the boundaries of good taste have become murky, then the solution can be to redraw them—or at least the ones that matter—as brightly as possible. Here is where moral insipidity starts to come in. Brightly drawn, obvious moral lines to let everyone know that, when it’s important, they can still count on you. But that’s not a full answer. Brightly drawn boundaries can fit with more sophisticated morality too. So why does dark humour lend itself to the insipid? Here are three suggestions.

One possibility I want to reject is that moral insipidity is just a narrative contrivance, to find one final boundary between the heroes and the villains of the story. This may sometimes be the case, but I think there’s also something particular to dark humour. And, also, I think what I’m about to say about moral insipidity goes further than just movies. For one example, I think it helps to explain parts of QAnon, or other forms of conspiracism which are obsessed with the purity and innocence of children.

Suicide Squad in front of US flag

To start, if the goal is trustworthiness, then that thing re-establishing trustworthiness has to be fundamental. That moral core has to be an absolute moral core, which creates enough moral gravity to ground everything else. This determines insipid morality’s inflexibility. Whenever a character in The Suicide Squad implores us to think of the children, that’s never expanded upon. The only children ever seen, in fact, are Bloodsport’s teenaged daughter and the metaphorical children of the squad. The children we’re being told to think of remain entirely abstract. They’re simply “the children”: some kind of universal absolute. This absoluteness confers reliability, meaning that when it comes to thinking of the children, you can count on the dark humourist.

This absoluteness relates to a second, closely related feature of insipid morality, which is that it has to establish the priority of the moral boundaries in question. Dark humour indulges in transgressing moral boundaries, so any boundary that has to be observed has to be more important than the others. It has to be okay to violate those other boundaries but not this one. If The Suicide Squad invites us to laugh at death, failed attempts at meaning, and the emptiness of the good, then that last inviolable moral boundary has to be placed above life, meaning, and the good.

Insipid morality… is not so much a result of undermining morality as it is a result of trying to reconstruct it.

Lastly, something has to ground that priority and that is a sense of purity. In the genre of dark humour, nearly every boundary is transgressed in the name of humour and nonsense. If the insipid morality is to work to establish trustworthiness, then it has to be free of that meaning- and morality-undermining nonsense. This means it has to stay pure. The priority of thinking of the children, then, finds itself not in that children have potential, or that they are part of a society, or even that they are human, for these boundaries have been transgressed. Rather, The Suicide Squad thinks of the children because the children have been untouched by the darkness of the rest of the movie. The purity of children, then, is free of trustworthiness-undermining nonsense.

These three factors together don’t strictly determine insipid morality. I think it is possible to have moral principles centred on absoluteness, priority, and purity that aren’t necessarily stupid. (Well, I might be a bit surprised if there was a non-stupid morality based on purity.) But, when dark humour does lead to insipid morality, I think this is the path that it travels. And, since the problem of trustworthiness is one that dark humour faces, we should expect dark humour to lead to insipidity fairly often. It’s an ironic conclusion—that transgressive humour should lead to trite, simplistic morality—but I think it’s easy enough to embrace. Insipid morality, if I’m right, is not so much a result of undermining morality as it is a result of trying to reconstruct it. And that’s maybe not the sort of task our darkest, most twisted minds are suited for.

"Footnotes"

[1] For more on this reciprocal approach to trustworthiness see Karen Jones, Trustworthiness, Ethics (2012).

[2] This approach to trustworthiness belongs to Katherine Hawley. You can read more in How to Be Trustworthy (2020).


References

  • Hawley, Katherine. How to Be Trustworthy, (Oxford: OUP, 2020).
  • Jones, Karen. Trustworthiness, Ethics, (2012).

Further Reading

A short overview of trust and trustworthiness can be found in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy page on trust.

An introduction to humour, including a discussion of dark humour, can be found in Noel Carroll’s Humour: A Very Short Introduction.

And since I disagree deeply with Carroll, I will selfishly recommend the section on why we value humour from my own piece, The Social Account of Humour.

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Guest <![CDATA[Bioware & Voluntary Slavery]]> https://www.epicureancure.com/?p=853 2022-01-27T15:11:38Z 2021-11-11T12:28:01Z A recurring theme in Bioware’s RPGs is the idea that slavery – while bad – can be justified if it’s chosen. Throughout the Dragon Age games, for instance, we learn that in the Tevinter Empire, slavery is legal. Many slaves are captured from other regions of Thedas, but additionally,

Free people may choose to sell themselves into slavery to provide for their families. Those slaves who are purchased by the Imperium itself rather than private individuals are called Servus Publicus, or state-owned slaves…[1]

In Dragon Age: Inquisition, a codex entry notes of the servus publicus that they “do all the tasks proper citizens will not.”[2] Tevinter mage and oft-beloved party member Dorian paints a rosier picture:

Dorian: In the south you have alienages, slums both alien and elven. The desperate have no way out. Back home, a poor man can sell himself. As a slave he could have a position of respect, comfort, and could even support a family. Some slaves are treated poorly, it’s true, but do you honestly think inescapable poverty is better?

Inquisitor: At least they’re free. They don’t have slavery forced on them.

Dorian: You think people choose to be poor and oppressed? I doubt it…

Dorian notes that back home slaves are everywhere and nobody questions it.

A similar conversation crops up in Mass Effect 2 on the planet Illium:

Shepard: I can’t believe an asari world would allow slavery!

Concierge: We try to avoid calling it slavery. All indentured servants on Illium have voluntarily agreed to a term of service. Most choose indentured service as a means to pay off debt or avoid imprisonment. A contract holder is responsible for the well-being of her servants, and a servant’s duties are agreed upon before the contract is signed.

The reality is less sanitised – as the player walks around Illium, an ad for a company called ‘IndentureTech’ plays in the background:

You’ve been a slave to your employees for too long. Shouldn’t it be the other way round?

In these examples, enforced slavery is distinguished from voluntary slavery. In what follows, we consider whether volunteering makes a moral difference.


For the purpose of our discussion, we can ask of the Bioware examples two questions:

  1. Do these examples ‘count’ as slavery?
  2. Does the putative voluntariness make a difference?

With regards to (1), one possible response is that indentured servitude standardly comes with limiting conditions built-in: you have to work to pay back x amount of money, or for y years, or until z event. Looked at this way, indentured servitude might be thought of as being more like an exceptionally onerous employment contract than like slavery – there are difficult conditions attached to escaping them, but it’s possible (by design). The indentured servant gives ten years’ service and is free; the volunteer army recruit gives three (or five, or seven) years’ service and is free. It’s not even unusual for there to be very punitive clauses dealing with what happens if the contract’s broken. So perhaps we should just think of indentured servitude as being high-risk (and, uh, low-reward) employment: if you don’t want to take the risk, don’t take the job. The invisible hand of the market solves the problem once again!

A slave broker on Illium notes that the arrangement she has with her servant is voluntary and legal.

Well, no. As it happens, there are good reasons to think of lots of modern employment contracts as forms of indentured servitude, including the ones given above – but that just means that many more people are in effect in servitude than we usually think.[3] This isn’t quite to re-assert the old claim that wage labour is slave labour, but it should make us wary of going “well really it’s just like being a wage labourer under capitalism, so obviously indentured servitude isn’t like slavery”.[4] Rather, it should suggest to us that if there is a relevant distinction between waged labour, indentured servitude, and slavery, it’s not (or not primarily) to do with how difficult it is to escape the respective conditions or even the consequences of doing so.

Instead, we might think the crucial difference is to do with power and power structures: specifically, the extent to which one’s freedom or ability to do otherwise than the boss says is a matter of structural power (im)balances. Let’s take two simplified cases.

Case 1: Kim Kitsuragi is employed by RCM as a police lieutenant. There are certain restrictions on what Kim may do at work, and on how many hours a week Kim can spend out of work. These restrictions are built into Kim’s contract.

Case 2: Crypti is a slave on a cocaine plantation on the Irmalan Plateau. There are restrictions on what Crypti may do at work, and how many hours a week Crypti can spend out of work; there are also restrictions on where Crypti may live, who they may see, probably who they may have intimate relationships or children with. These restrictions may or may not be formalised.

Crypti is situated such that by design their life is vulnerable to arbitrary interference at the whim of another – in the philosophical jargon, they’re dominated (see Pettit 1996; 1997). It’s not just that somebody could interfere with their life, it’s that the social structures they inhabit are designed to make this possible. Conversely, the social structures that Kim inhabits are designed to limit how much his employer can interfere with his life. These structures might be – are likely to be – imperfect.[5] Still, their explicit goal is to make sure that Kim is able to make his own decisions not only about how to do his job, but more importantly whether or not to do his job at all. Kim is non-dominated, while Crypti is dominated – and they seem to be dominated in just the way that the people in the Bioware examples are dominated (a servus publicus cannot choose to become a merchant instead).


So we have reason to think that Tevinter and IndentureTech are indeed engaging in slavery, and can turn to the second question: Does volunteering make a difference?

To answer this question, it helps to think about autonomy. What you conclude will depend on whether you think of autonomy primarily as a matter of knowing what you want to do; of doing what you want to do with your life; or of being able to control how your life goes.[6] Let’s consider each of these in turn.

Taking the first line, we find people like Frankfurt (1971) and Dworkin (1976; 1981). According to them, autonomy is – very roughly – a matter of endorsing your first-order desires at a higher-order level. Say you have some first-order, world-facing desire, like “I want a pint”. If you want this desire to be effective – if you endorse its efficacy at a higher-order level – then according to them you’re autonomous. Under this view autonomy is a psychological matter, one to do with the efficacy of the “deep” or “true” self over its first-order desires. So long as the enslaved agent continues to endorse those desires that point them in the direction of slavery, it is indeed conceptually possible to be an autonomous slave.[7]

Regardless of whether you think this is convincing in the slave case, there are reasons to be suspicious of structuralist views. Suppose that a Tevinter woman becomes a servus publicus, reasoning that it is the best (and perhaps only) way to save her family from poverty, but feels considerable grief at the loss of her former freedom. In other words, she has a first-order desire to be free, but endorses her servitude at a higher-order level. Marilyn Friedman (1986: 31) pointed out that on views like Frankfurt’s and Dworkin’s, the servus publicus would be made more autonomous by rejecting

 “her frustration grief and depression, and the motivations to change her life which spring from these sources…[and which] may be her only reliable guides.”[8]

That is, supposing that she still endorses the servitude, still “wants to want” to be a good servant, then under the structuralist model she would become more autonomous by squashing the desire to chib the overseer, set fire to the big house and run like hell for a less constrained life. This seems – to use the technical term – exactly bass-ackwards to Friedman. Thinking about why might be illuminating.

Generally, we think of autonomous agents as not merely knowing (more or less) what they want out of life, but also being able (more or less) to get it. In Friedman-type cases, though, it seems not only that you can become more autonomous by subordinating what you want to some pre-existent conception of what you should want, but also that whether you get what you want is irrelevant to whether you’re autonomous.

“You think people choose to be poor and oppressed? I doubt it…”

A response might be to invoke what’s called procedural independence, in other words, that how you form your desires is important too. The procedural independence theorist is likely to say of the voluntary slave that something is amiss with how they’ve formed the desires to be subservient – faced with the choice between slavery or starvation, the person is making choices that, because of the pressure, don’t represent who they “really” are. This may well be true in lots of cases, but i) we ought to be careful of suggesting that people aren’t competent over their own desires, and ii) it still doesn’t evade the problem that so long as your desires line up right -  or have been/can be subjected to critical thought - whether they’re met doesn’t matter for autonomy. This seems weird considering that “living a life of one’s own” is near-as-damnit the one-line gloss on what it is to be autonomous.

“Aha!” say proponents of what’re sometimes called the self-authorship family of views, “precisely! In these cases, your desires might represent the real you, but your life isn’t the life that you want, and so you’re not autonomous”. According to them, to be autonomous is to “decide for [yourself] what is valuable, and to live [your] life in accordance with that decision” (Colburn, 2010). On this view, so long as the agent has thought carefully and critically about what they want, then they are autonomous insofar as they get what they want. The same will apply for the person who wants to be enslaved. Again, almost nobody thinks that this is likely, but it’s a conceptual possibility: it is possible to be an autonomous slave, if the life of slavery is consistent with your decisions about what is valuable.

Character named concierge says that they try to avoid calling their indentured servitude slavery as all servants voluntarily agree to a term of service.

And, obviously, this explains why voluntariness is important: if you choose to x, under conditions of procedural independence, then it seems fairly safe to say that x-ing represents what you want out of life – that you’ve decided for yourself that x is valuable, and can now live in accordance with that decision. Under the views we’ve so far considered, then, the IndentureTech employee and the servus publicus could be autonomous, although it’s unlikely.

The relational view offers a different analysis.[9] On this view, what it is to be autonomous is to be (more or less) in control of your life – to be socially situated such that your desires about life are taken seriously precisely because they’re your desires, and that you are able to pursue these desires. In other words, to be authoritative and powerful over the direction of your life. Someone who’s enslaved is not powerful over the direction of their life; definitionally, they’re vulnerable to interference at the whims of another.[10] Under a relational account, then, the slave isn’t autonomous.

"You’ve been a slave to your employees for too long. Shouldn’t it be the other way round?"

Interestingly, this means that voluntariness doesn’t make a difference: you may very well have been autonomous when you decided to commit yourself to slavery, but once that’s happened you aren’t any longer. Imagine that you freely decide to be tied up. Once you’ve made the decision, your movements are restricted, and the duration of the restriction is now out of your control – hopefully you’ll be released if you ask to be, but you’re much more vulnerable than you were before the binding. Likewise, the servus publicus might have freely sold themselves, but can’t then change their mind and become a hairdresser instead.

That’s not to say that voluntariness doesn’t matter for relational theories. It’s clearly important for being powerful and authoritative that your choices are taken seriously, and so voluntariness is important. But it’s not a sufficient condition for autonomy – it’s not enough. Merely wanting to do something doesn’t mean that doing it makes you autonomous. Autonomy relationally construed is a social phenomenon, and so – perhaps counterintuitively – we’ve got really strong reasons to prevent some kinds of relations from obtaining. Voluntary or no, your boss having near-untrammelled power over how your life goes is not consistent with your being able to decide how your life goes.

As Dorian notes, “Abuse heaped on those without power isn’t limited” to slavery. But choosing slavery doesn’t mean that what’s ‘heaped on’ isn’t abuse.

Footnotes

[1] https://dragonage.fandom.com/wiki/Slavery

[2] An in-game Codex entry, attributed to In Pursuit of Knowledge: The Travels of a Chantry Scholar by Brother Genitivi. Full text available at https://dragonage.fandom.com/wiki/Codex_entry:_Tevinter_Society.

[3] You’ll have noticed, for example, that “don’t take the job” is real easy advice to dispense from a comfy armchair, but carries all the heft of a gnat’s fart if taking the job is the only alternative to penury and starvation.

[4] Cohen (1982) draws this queasy parallel, though he does at least admit that he probably ought not to be equating wage labour and chattel slavery.

[5] That’s why you should join a union. Go on, I’ll wait.

[6] But wait, aren’t these last two the same thing? No, as <takes hold of tablecloth meaningfully> I’ll go on to suggest.

[7] I should add that neither of them think this is especially likely, though.

[8] Friedman’s original example refers to someone confronting internalised misogynistic norms regarding “a woman’s place”.

[9] Strictly, the constitutive social-relational view. See Oshana (1998; 2006).

[10] I also think that enslavement relations must deny the authority of the agent, but we can leave that aside.


References:

  • Cohen, G. The Structure of Proletarian UnfreedomPhilosophy and Public Affairs, 12:1 (1983), pp. 3-33.
  • Colburn, B. Autonomy and Liberalism (Routledge: New York, 2010).
  • Dworkin, G. Autonomy and Behavior ControlThe Hastings Center Report, 6:1 (1976), pp. 23-28.
  • Frankfurt, H. Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person, Journal of Philosophy, 68:1 (1971), pp. 5-20.
  • Friedman, M. Autonomy and the Split-Level Self, Southern Journal of Philosophy, 24:1 (1986), pp. 19-35.
  • Oshana, M. Personal Autonomy and Society, Journal of Social Philosophy, 29:1 (1998), pp. 81-102.
  • Oshana, M. Personal Autonomy in Society (Ashgate: Aldershot, 2006).
  • Pettit, P. Freedom as Anti-Power, Ethics, 106:3 (1996).
  • Pettit, P. Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and Government (Oxford University Press: New York, 1997).

Further Reading

For more examples of in-text justifications for slavery, check out the TV Tropes page on "Happiness in Slavery".

To learn more about philosophical accounts of autonomy, you could start with the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy entries on autonomy in moral and political philosophy and feminist perspectives on autonomy.

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Guest <![CDATA[Okja and the Limits of Shame]]> https://www.epicureancure.com/?p=838 2021-10-22T14:06:43Z 2021-10-22T14:06:41Z Heavy spoiler alert! If you haven’t watched Okja, desperately want to, and read this review first, you really only have yourself to blame for what happens next.

Bong Joon-Ho’s 2017 film Okja tells the story of a young Korean girl, Mija (Ahn Seo-Hyun), trying to get her superpig Okja back from the Mirando corporation.

Little girl Mija with Okja her superpig

Along the way she crosses path with the activist group the Animal Liberation Front, who view Mirando’s superpig celebration as a way to unmask the corporation’s environmentally-friendly hypocrisy. The ALF’s plan is to humiliate both the corporation and its CEO Lucy Mirando (Tilda Swinton): for Lucy to change through the power of shame and embarrassment. What I want to do in this article is to talk a little bit about the power of shame and embarrassment as seen through the lens of Okja. This involves showing what can be accomplished through shame, but also what can’t.

A buoyant Lucy Mirando introduces the best superpig competition

So, first, what does the movie show us about Lucy Mirando and the Mirando corporation? After all, if shaming Lucy is an important part of this movie, then we have to establish what she’s being shamed for. Our introduction to both the corporation and its CEO begins with the first scene, and immediately suggests contrasts. Lucy Mirando, happy, upbeat, and dressed all in Apple-appropriate clean white addresses a group of journalists within a former industrial building. She announces a break from how her father used to run the company: he was a “terrible man,” who committed “atrocities” which stained the building’s walls “with the blood of fine working men.” In contrast, Lucy wants to signal a new commitment to “new core values” of “environment and life.”

To celebrate this new direction, she announces a competition and new product. They have discovered a new animal in South America: a superpig. These superpigs are an environmental wonder, consuming fewer resources and producing less waste.  They have carefully reproduced 26 of these superpigs and sent them around the world to be raised in accordance with different local, traditional farming techniques. The superpigs will then be visited by Dr. Johnny Wilcox (Jake Gyllenhaal), a character best described as 'David Attenborough by way of Waluigi', who will declare a winner for 'Best Superpig'.

Dr Johnny

This opening scene tells us a lot quickly about Mirando, both the person and the corporation. They’re trying to make a transition from old way to new ways. The old ways are rough and brutal, represented not just by Lucy’s words but the rough building the press conference takes place in. They’re industrial, based on an opposition between the bosses and the workers. In contrast, Lucy’s new ways are friendly, cooperative, environmentally- and globally-conscious. The dour functional industrialism of her father has been replaced by the smiling, clean and well-animated Mirando of the present.

From this description you can probably guess the ALF’s motivation, and how the plot initially progresses. They want to show that the new Mirando corporation is not so different from the old. They want to show that Lucy’s stated values of a happier, more environmentally friendly Mirando are nothing but talk. To achieve this, they attach a secret camera to Okja’s ear which records nefarious goings-on at Mirando’s headquarters, including a drunken Dr. Johnny torturing Okja. These recordings are then broadcast at Mirando’s superpig celebration in downtown New York, showing the world that Lucy’s kinder, gentler façade is all hypocrisy. The ALF’s plan is that this will shame and embarrass both Lucy Mirando and the Mirando corporation, and that this will further the ALF’s goal of a more just society for non-human animals. But why should shame and embarrassment be expected to accomplish that?

ALF members, hooded and masked

To understand how the ALF expected to achieve their goals, it helps to know a few things about emotions in general. The first is that emotions often have objects, which are what the emotions are about. So when I am afraid I am not merely afraid, but I am afraid of some awful animal lurking in the shadows. When I’m proud the source of my pride is an accomplishment, like writing this blog post. Second, emotions prompt a response of some sort. Pride leads you to stand a little taller and maybe push your chest out. Fear leads you to run away. The third is that emotional experiences direct our attention at the object, and prompt us to search for reasons why that reaction might be well-founded. Returning to the fear example, the fear keeps my attention on the animal and prompts me to see whether or not it’s dangerous. If the animal is a ravenous wolf, then my fear is well-founded because the wolf is dangerous to me; if the animal is a hapless mouse then my fear is not well-founded because it’s not dangerous to me. This indicates a fourth thing about emotions, which is that what they have us looking for in the object is evaluatively important. So the fear leads me to evaluate the mouse as dangerous, and the pride leads me to evaluate writing this blog post as an accomplishment worth feeling good about. This evaluative characteristic of emotions is so important that some theorists have argued that emotions are a special kind of perception specifically for perceiving evaluative properties, though that’s not important for us now.[1] What’s important is that emotions have an object (they are about something), and they lead us to focus on this object and look for reasons which support that emotion’s relevant evaluation, and respond appropriately. Now let’s apply that to shame and embarrassment.

Shame and embarrassment are emotions we feel when we’ve done something wrong. There’s some disagreement as to whether they are genuinely different emotions, or just the same emotion experienced at different levels of intensity.[2] For the sake of this post and conceptual cleanliness, let’s stipulate a difference: embarrassment is for when you’ve done something wrong in the context of etiquette. It’s a social offence, but merely a faux pas. The sort of thing you’d probably feel comfortable laughing about if it happened to someone else. Shame, on the other hand, is for when you’ve committed a moral offence. These aren’t merely violations of etiquette, but instances of having done something seriously wrong.

If shame and embarrassment are about having done something wrong, then what they’re about — their object — is the thing we feel we’ve done wrong. We feel small and shrink away; where pride has us stand tall and beam, with shame and embarrassment we have trouble meeting people’s gaze. In fact, as with fear, there’s often the urge to run away from the social situation entirely. And, lastly, the reasons embarrassment and shame have us looking for are going to what made our action wrong. If embarrassing, which social rules did we violate? If shameful, what moral rules did we transgress?

Lucy’s new ways are friendly, cooperative, environmentally- and globally-conscious.

Understanding shame and embarrassment in this way, we can see more of what the ALF was trying to achieve. First of all, by shaming Lucy Mirando they aimed to make her confront that her actions were morally wrong, especially  that the cruelty Mirando corporation was inflicting on animals was wrong and needed to be stopped. Even if Lucy was not necessarily susceptible to shame, the ALF also targeted her for embarrassment by showing her hypocrisy. She was failing to live up to her own ideals of a happier, friendlier Mirando corporation. Both of these reactions would be helped along by public outrage, a loud and vocal public who also see Mirando corporation as shameful and Lucy as embarrassed. This would ideally result in the behavioural effects of shame and embarrassment: Lucy Mirando and the Mirando corporation going away. So, how does that work out?

This is where the movie gets particularly interesting, and where Bong shows us what he thinks of as the limits of shame’s political usefulness.

Throughout the movie Lucy has been taunted in conversation by her sister Nancy. After the calamity at the superpig festival we finally meet Nancy to discover that she (also played by Tilda Swinton) is Lucy’s identical twin. But where Lucy is happy, upbeat, and defined by clean light colours Nancy is dark, scowling behind sunglasses, and wearing earth tones. She even talks with a growl as she tells Lucy that the board has decided to put Nancy in charge. Nancy’s first order of business? Ignore all press and send all the superpigs to the slaughter. Once the product is out, people won’t care how it got there if it’s cheap. Even Okja, the prize-winning best superpig is ordered slaughtered. Why? In Nancy’s words, “we can only sell the dead ones.”

Nancy wearing sunglasses and a grim expression

The climax of the movie takes places at the slaughterhouse as Mija, along with Jay (Paul Dano) and K (Steve Yeun) of the ALF rush to save Okja from slaughter. Jay and K are caught by security and escorted out, just as Nancy arrives to oversee the start of the plant’s operations. They yell at her that she should be ashamed, but she doesn’t care. She first responds by shouting “fuck off! We’re proud of what we accomplish,” before eventually settling into apathy. Ultimately, she doesn’t care what Jay and K have to say. Mija does manage to save Okja, but only by bartering Nancy a golden pig in exchange. “Our first sale,” Nancy triumphantly declares, as she drops the golden pig in her pocket.

Shame, obviously, has no power over Nancy. Or, at least, Jay and K have no ability to shame her. She doesn’t care about their attempts to shame her because she doesn’t care about their standards, and they have no ability to make her care about their standards. She is not immoral so much as she’s amoral, a creature of pure capitalism pursuing profit and profit alone. This shows us one limitation of shame and embarrassment: they are social emotions that ultimately rely on the compliance of the person who would be shamed or embarrassed. If they’re not willing to correct their behaviour of their own volition, you need something extra to make them comply. But there’s more, too.

Once the product is out, people won’t care how it got there if it’s cheap.

Remember that Lucy and Nancy are identical twins, and the corporation carries their name. The ALF aren’t just trying to take on Lucy Mirando, they’re trying to take on the whole corporation. But in using the tactics of shame and embarrassment they can only defeat the part of Mirando that is susceptible to shame and embarrassment. That’s Lucy, who wants to do things better: friendlier, more eco-conscious, more animal friendly. But those features of Lucy, those parts that make her susceptible to shame, are not what the ALF is seeking to target. This leads to what Bong shows us in the film: the friendliness, the ecological consciousness, the general desire to ‘be better’ is simply jettisoned. The crude industrial mechanisms which grind everything to dust for profit persist.

Feeling shame and embarrassment is a pretty important part of living together. It’s a key part of treating each other better, and respecting the standards of others. But, Bong reminds us, this is deeply limited. It leads us to being better people, but the problems plaguing the world are deeper than the transgressions of people trying to be good. Mija may learn to be a vegetarian, but the Mirando machine grinds on. This is perhaps why Bong ends the movie where he does: with Jay and K leaving prison. They meet up with other members of the ALF on a bus before masking up for their next mission. The fight’s not done. We go again.

Footnotes

[1] You can find a survey of such views in the second chapter of Michael Brady, Emotional Insight (Oxford University Press: 2013).

[2] W Ray Crozier, Differentiating Shame from Embarrassment, Emotion Review 6, no.3 (2014): 271.


Further Reading:

If you want to read more about how emotions direct our attention and lead us to search for reasons, check out Michael Brady’s Emotional Insight (2013).

For more on emotions and evaluation, the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy is good as always. See sections 5, 6 and 7 of their page on emotions.

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Guest <![CDATA[Trope Alert: Moral Warping]]> https://www.epicureancure.com/?p=799 2021-07-14T15:20:52Z 2021-07-14T15:20:51Z I’ve always been interested in how superhero movies present the battle between good and evil. The (usually titular) superhero isn’t just the goodie but the goodie for some particular reason. Maybe they represent some important set of values, or perhaps fight to defend a vision of society. The villain opposing the superhero also represents something, maybe an opposing set of values or a dark reflection of the hero. Through this opposition the film constructs a kind of moral world: a vision of what is good and what is bad, at least within the film.

Animation of Zod fighting Superman

Sometimes, constructing the moral world doesn’t go smoothly. Maybe the hero doesn’t seem to stand for anything good, and so there’s no reason to accept them as the hero. Or perhaps the villain isn’t especially villainous; a sympathetic villain is common enough but something about this character makes it seem like they’re just straightforwardly in the right. There are a few ways a film can deal with this problem. One is to just ignore it and power through, in which case you end up with a thematically-unmotivated conflict. Another is to try and embrace a bad hero or good villain, and end up with a movie espousing some ugly values. I want to talk about a third option, which I call moral warping.

Moral warping is a kind of thematic narrative contrivance, where a character (usually a designated villain) does something out of line with other elements of their characterisation for the sake of making the character conform with their designated role as hero or villain. More specifically, we can think of moral warping as happening when:

  1. A character is given a set of motivations and values which define that character’s role in the story, and
  2. Those motivations and values seem to dictate a moral role in the story (goodie or baddie), other than the moral role that character actually has, and
  3. The character does something to bring them in to line with their moral role, and
  4. Importantly, this thing they do to bring them back in to line with their role does not seem to flow from, fit with, or otherwise be reconciled with their initial defining motivations and values.
Killmonger at the museum

A good first example for moral warping is Marvel’s Black Panther (2018) and the character of Killmonger. He is introduced in a British museum, correcting the curator about the provenance of stolen artefacts. His origin story is that he was abandoned in Oakland by the Wakandan King T’Chaka after his father became too sympathetic to the Black liberation movement, returns to Wakanda to challenge for political leadership through the politically-recognized method of trial by combat, eliminates the magic herb which sustains the monarchy (declaring himself to be the last king), and states his motivation to be the end of Black oppression worldwide. This motivation obviously resonated with many people, leading to the meme, hashtag, and any number of articles titled “Killmonger was right.”[1]

Of course, this is only a partial description of the character. Through the movie we are given reasons to think he is not really motivated by liberation. Rather, he is motivated by spite and revenge. Revenge against the royal family for abandoning him, and spite at having had to live in the US rather than Wakanda’s techno-utopia. He suffuses his mission to ship weapons to Black liberation movements with the language of the British empire, promising that the “Sun will never set” on Wakanda.

Moral warping is a kind of thematic narrative contrivance... for the sake of making the character conform with their designated role as hero or villain.

It is easy to see how Killmonger might be subject to moral warping. The character is fundamentally presented as an anti-colonial revolutionary, opposing oppression worldwide, only for that to be undercut by the revelation that he’s just a psychologically-hurt would-be oppressor. This sort of warping is easy for audiences to spot and instinctively unskew because the idea that revolutionaries are just psychologically hurt is nothing new. As Tommy Curry has shown, the idea that Black men are motivated by a simultaneous desire to replicate white oppression while rejecting white values has a long history in the United States.[2] If the badness of Killmonger’s character is a common slander against Black revolutionaries, it’s easy to mentally class the character’s badness as not fully real. The bad acts are discounted, and Killmonger remains understood as a real revolutionary.

However, despite Killmonger’s badness being a common slander, his badness still fits with his character. The moral world of the Marvel Cinematic Universe is defined, in part, by the goodness of hierarchical power structures that isolate power in the hands of a few great people, and the fundamental goodness of the status quo.

Hydra operatives from Captain America: A Winter Soldier

(Even when the baddies have control of the status quo this is presented as a problem of infection. Get rid of the baddies and all is well, no need to change how the system actually works. The most extreme case of this is in Captain America: the Winter Soldier where it is revealed that the entire American military and security apparatus has been overtaken by a HYDRA (effectively super Nazis) conspiracy. Once the HYDRA agents are vanquished, the heroes simply take back control of the apparatus.)

In the context of the movie’s moral world, his desires for global revolution and an end to the monarchy were always bad. The character’s villainy is, within the movie’s moral world, continuous with his initial characterization. This is, after all, a movie whose climactic action set piece involves a CIA officer operating military drones to help the rightfully-deposed King T’Challa retake power through a coup. Altogether, then, the character of Killmonger is less a case of moral warping than it is of the movie simply having ugly values.

A better example is found in the previous year’s Marvel offering, Spiderman: Homecoming. Here, the villain is Adrian Toomes, AKA the Vulture. Toomes is a former construction contractor who loses his business after Tony Stark uses his government connections to take over a number of reconstruction projects after the events of Avengers: Assemble (2012). Driven to desperation, Toomes and his construction crew turn to stealing alien technology and selling it as weapons.

The Vulture from Spiderman: Homecoming

Unlike with Killmonger, there isn’t a thematic through line from a construction contractor and father figure disrupted by government corruption to weapons dealer. Rather, Toomes’ criminality seems to be entirely motivated by the need to set him up as a foil for Tony Stark. What’s important here – and what makes this a true case of moral warping – is that absent Toomes stealing and selling weapons, there is nothing in Toomes’ characterization that would make him a baddie.

Toomes’ character, while not as well-developed as Killmonger, still manages to reflect interesting ideas. For example, it’s striking for how closely it matches the subject of China Miéville’s short story Scrap-Iron Man.[3] In that story, a collective of workers discarded during the 2008 economic downturn put together a suit of scrap metal and set off to fight Tony Stark for being one of the billionaires who rendered their hometown destitute. The characters, like Toomes’ Vulture, are laid off construction workers, build their own armour from scraps, and have a conflict with Tony Stark for being the author of their destitution. The characters represent the same symbols, have the same enemies, and have at least similar motivations. However Toomes must be a villain, and Stark a hero, so Toomes arbitrarily does evil. The character is warped into a villain so that he fits within the movie’s moral world.

Footnotes

[1] A brief sampling: Lynette Monroe, Black Panther Analysis: Was Killmonger Right?, The Charleston Chronicle; Killmonger was Right: How the Black Panther’s Villian Stole the Show, Complex News; BFoundAPen, Killmonger was Right, Medium. And then there are articles that took the idea as a jumping off point: Adam Serwer, The Tragedy of Erik Killmonger, The Atlantic; Justin Charity and Micah Peters, How Do You Solves a Problem Like Wakanda?, The Ringer.

[2] Tommy J Curry, The Man-Not: Race, Class, Genre, and the Dilemmas of Black Manhood, Temple University Press (2017).

[3] China Miéville, Rejected Pitch, Rejectamentalist Manifesto. Posted April 7, 2011.


References

Further Viewing

If you want more media with moral warping, Iron Man 2’s Ivan Vanko is another victim turned evil to affirm Tony Stark’s goodness.

There are also movies which engage moral warping head on. Disney’s Maleficent asks what the titular character might be if she wasn’t forced to be the ‘wicked woman’ in Sleeping Beauty, while X-Men: First Class examines a moral world where Magneto’s radicalism is in the right and Charles Xavier’s liberalism is a kind of complicity.

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Guest <![CDATA[Why Care if They Made it Up? Historical Accuracy in The Trial of the Chicago 7]]> https://www.epicureancure.com/?p=766 2021-05-11T15:07:32Z 2021-05-11T15:04:24Z At the climax of The Trial of the Chicago 7, Tom Hayden uses his closing remarks to read out the names of Americans killed in the Vietnam War. One by one the defendants stand and raise their fists in solidarity. Music swells as the gallery stands. Eventually Richard Schultz, the prosecutor, sheds a tear and rises as well. “What are you doing?” asks his co-prosecutor, to which Schultz answers “paying respects.” It’s a powerful, well-constructed scene with a very significant problem: it never happened.

Photo of the trial defendants from the film

Why should this bother us? After all, movies of historical events are full of things that didn’t happen. Conversations are invented, thoughts speculated, and perspectives manufactured. Very little of the dialogue spoken in Chicago 7 was actually uttered by the historical figures portrayed on film, so why would some scenes and not others stand out as particularly wrong? To put it another way, what is it that makes us care about the historical accuracy of some scenes more than others?

The natural place to start is the idea that some fictionalized scenes make the movie worse, but others do not. We don’t care about the smaller inventions because they don’t substantially affect how the movie goes, they’re more like the little cogs that keep the rest of the movie ticking. Inaccuracies in the big showpiece scenes, on the other hand, are the real substance of the movie. If the big scenes are bad, that’s much more significant in making the whole film bad, so it’s the big scenes that we care about.

Now, we have to be careful about not falling prey to a circularity here. What I’ve just written could be interpreted as saying that we care about the big scenes because they determine the goodness or badness of the movie, and those scenes determine the goodness or badness of the movie because we care about them. To dodge this problem, I need to offer an additional way to think about the big scenes being good or bad. For this I want to reach for aesthetic cognitivism.

Aesthetic cognitivism has two components. The first is the idea that works of art can have cognitive content. This means that art can be a source of understanding about the world, and provides us the sort of content which is the basis of understanding. The second part of aesthetic cognitivism is that works of art can be better or worse as works of art based on their cognitive content.

Picture of Disney Cinderella being attacked by her stepsisters

A common type of cognitive content is what’s called a “cognitive-affective perspective.” This means that a film does not just present the viewer with a bare set of facts, but it presents an emotionally-laden way of viewing a subject justified by certain information. In the case of Cinderella, for example, we are invited to feel sympathetic towards the titular Cinderella, and that sympathy is justified by the suffering inflicted upon her by her wicked stepmother and stepsisters.

This starts to help us understand why we care about some scenes in a movie but not others. The small scenes, the cogs that just keep the film moving, don’t necessarily provide cognitive-affective perspectives on the important historical events. And to the extent that they do contribute to such perspectives on the characters, their contributions are minor: hallway dialogue developing characters or a moment alone to show how a character is feeling. On the other hand, significant scenes like the climactic honouring of the dead in Chicago 7, play a very significant role in determining the cognitive-affective perspective a film offers of its subjects.

What is the perspective offered by that courtroom scene? First of all, it shows the protagonists as righteous. Specifically, they’re righteous because of a commitment to a set of higher values of justice and unity centred on a patriotic belief in the value of America. This unity is endorsed by (and therefore the righteousness is extended to) not just the defendants and observers, but also the prosecutor.

It’s a powerful, well-constructed scene with a very significant problem: it never happened.

The patriotic commitment of the scene is the culmination of the film’s narrative which emphasizes the patriotic commitment of the characters: Abbie Hoffman talks on the stand about the greatness of American institutions, Jerry Rubin defends a flag-waving protester from a sexual assault by a bunch of frat bros, and the reveal of Tom Hayden’s radical commitment begins with defending a teenager ascending a flagpole. Bobby Seale, leader of the Black Panther Party, is granted a mistrial after his treatment by the judge is so egregious that the prosecutor Schultz is moved to outrage. Altogether, then, the film offers a vision of the defendants, especially Hoffman and Hayden, as true patriots who believe in the strength and virtue of the American ideal. Their patriotism is so strong that the abuses of the court move everyone to outrage, and that outrage becomes a source of patriotic unity. This culminates in the film combining the symbols of a defiant raising of the fist with standing to mourn America’s war dead.

So what’s the problem?

Cognitivism holds that art can be a source of understanding. To offer proper understanding of something, what the film offers about that thing must be true. The patriotic narrative is not true. In fact, it is strikingly false. While Hayden did record America’s war dead in his notebook, he did not record only America’s war dead. He recorded all the war dead, especially those of the Vietnamese. His opposition to the war was not rooted in an American patriotism, but rather an opposition to war as an imperial project. Hayden saw this imperial project as fundamental to the United States, and so opposing the war meant opposing the entirety of the American state structure. The movie inverts the entire moral mission of the defendants. They are not patriots driven to outrage by the corruption of American virtues, as the film presents, but universally-minded political activists driven by an opposition to inextricable American vices.[1]

Photo of protestors of the Vietnam War

And what of the message of unity? The prosecutor Schultz, it turns out, felt no such sympathy for the defendants. In fact, interviews conducted with Schultz leading up to the release of the film show that he’s still convinced of the righteousness of the trial, and the criminality of the defence.[2] In light of Schultz’s lasting commitment to the righteousness of the prosecution, the film’s presented unity between him and the defendants seems particularly misplaced.

Altogether, then, the film presents a cognitive-affective perspective that seems to get important facts wrong. It therefore presents an incorrect understanding of historical events, which undermines its cognitive value. To this we might add that since The Trial of the Chicago 7 is specifically of a genre that cares about accurately depicting historical events, this cognitive disvalue is particularly significant. If the movie is bad at one of the things it is specifically supposed to be good at, then that seems significant.

However, there’s still something missing. When the film misrepresents the moral mission of the defendants, it seems to be doing something not just factually wrong, but morally wrong. The issue is not just that the movie is worse as a movie, but rather that it (or the filmmakers) have committed some more serious moral offence. I believe this can be addressed by appealing again to cognitive-affective perspectives. Specifically, we can say that the cognitive-affective perspectives the film provides are not merely inaccurate to historical events, they’re morally inaccurate too.

So what’s the problem?

Chicago 7’s moral inaccuracy is grounded in its historical inaccuracy. This is to say that the perspective the film offers is wrong in such a way that the factual wrongness is itself morally bad. Some of this is part of a disrespect for the historical characters. Hayden, Hoffman, Seale, and the rest of the defendants ended up on trial for acting on political convictions which were deeply important to them. Misrepresenting their important personal convictions consequently fails to respect how their actions followed from their values. This insult is heightened by the film inverting their values, turning them in to dedicated patriots.

There is also a deeper moral wrong. The film presents a cognitive-affective perspective not just on the characters but on a deeper set of values. The film presents a moralized view of the world which centres the value of American institutions, American lives, and American patriotism. The greatest sins in the world of Chicago 7 are not of the mass murder that Hoffman, Hayden and Seale actually opposed but rather disunity and procedural impropriety. In showing Hayden and Hoffman as patriots and Schultz as sympathetic, the historical inaccuracy of the movie turns in to moral offence, not just promoting questionable moral values but doing so at the expense of a more penetrating and urgent moral criticism.

Photo of six of the Chicago 7

This, then, gives us our twofold answer to the question of why we care about the historical inaccuracy in The Trial of the Chicago 7. The film does not just relay to us a set of historical facts, but also presents an emotionally-laden perspective on those facts. The inaccuracy of the facts, and the inaptitude of the perspective, undercuts the film’s cognitive value: by presenting a false vision of past motivations the film thereby presents an incorrect understanding of historical events. This inaccuracy is morally loaded, as it promotes not just an inaccurate factual understanding but also a bad set of moral values. This helps explain both why we might think historical inaccuracy makes a film worse and also why historical inaccuracy is a moral offence that extends beyond questions of a film’s value.


Footnotes

[1] Jeet Heer, Aaron Sorkin sanitizes the Chicago 7, Nation, October 21, 2020. "https://www.thenation.com/article/culture/chicago-7-trial-film/"

[2] Jason Meisner, Chicago 7 Prosecutor: ‘They were going to try and destroy our trial. And they did a damn good job.’, Chicago Tribute, October 28, 2020. https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/criminal-justice/ct-chicago-7-prosecutor-dick-schultz-seminar-20201020-xlabkrtwrfgk3mezgraswhqkxq-story.html

Further Reading

If you wish to delve further, see chapters 7 and 8 of Berys Gaut's Art, Emotion and Ethics, Oxford University Press (2007).

If you want to explore other aspects of philosophy of film, you might start with the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosphy entry on Philosophy of Film.

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Guest <![CDATA[Picard, Time Travel & Moral Motivation]]> https://www.epicureancure.com/?p=659 2020-06-06T11:32:53Z 2020-03-21T14:33:54Z The first season of Star Trek: Picard is more than half-way through now. I’ve thoroughly enjoyed being back in Picard’s world. However, I have a gripe! The series entrenches the destruction of Romulus into the history. We were already familiar with the destruction of Romulus from J. J. Abrams’s 2009 Star Trek. In that film, it is established that shortly after the destruction of the Romulan homeworld, Nero – the villain of that story – travels back in time, leading to the creation of what has become known as the “Kelvin timeline”.

Comic panel, Nero taunting Spock about how his time travel failed to save Vulcan.

With the movies taking place in the Kelvin timeline, and Picard taking place in the original timeline, commencing after Nero has travelled back in time, it is established that both of these timelines exist. All well and good, right?

Wrong. This leads to some horrible implications over the whole of Star Trek. Let me explain.

The Timelines

Nero accidentally travels back in time from 2387, arriving in 2258. As Zachary Quinto’s Spock explains,

Nero’s very presence has altered the flow of history, beginning with the attack on the USS Kelvin, culminating in the events of today, thereby creating an entire new chain of incidents that cannot be anticipated by either party.[1]

This lets the audience know that the universe won’t – or need not – turn out as they remembered from classic Star Trek. This is nice, because we can’t sit back happily knowing what’s going to happen.

But here Spock talks of Nero altering the flow of history. This suggests that the timeline was one way, and Nero’s travelling back in time has changed it. For one thing, Nero destroys Vulcan because he blames the Federation and Spock for the destruction of his own homeworld and wants revenge.

The storyline of Picard takes place after Nero has gone back in time, in 2399. So, we know that the timeline continued after Nero’s travelling back in time. And it continues with the same history it always had. In Picard’s history books, there is no mention of Nero encountering Starfleet in the 23rd century. Vulcan is still intact. Everything has simply continued as normal, it seems, but without Nero and Spock (who presumably everyone thinks have mysteriously disappeared).

So, we have two timelines. “What’s the problem?” I hear you ask. Well, I’ll tell you!

Q mocking Picard for his conception of time

What a Mess

For one, this is incongruous with lots of other instances of time travel in Star Trek. In First Contact, for instance, the Enterprise-E Borg sphere goes back in time. While somehow protected in a “temporal wake”, they see the effects of the Borg sphere travelling back; they see an Earth assimilated. As Data says, Earth then has a “population of nine billion, all Borg”.[2] Presumably the Enterprise didn’t magically jump from one timeline to another here, so what would explain this? The obvious thought is that there is one timeline, and the Borg sphere altered it by preventing Zefram Cochrane’s launch and advancing humanity’s first encounter with the Borg by hundreds of years.

However, if it is the case that when you go back in time, rather than altering the timeline, you create another, this doesn’t make sense. What the Enterprise-E crew should have seen was everything continuing as normal – at least in their timeline. The Borg assimilation of Earth would have taken place in an entirely different timeline, as with Nero’s destruction of Vulcan.

Perhaps there is some way that we could explain this. Maybe sometimes – in special cases perhaps – going back in time creates a new timeline, but not always. As an explanation goes, however, that seems to raise more questions than answers!

Alternatively, we might think that this was a mistake, and we should ignore it like we do lots of other gaffes from writers. Sticking with First Contact, for instance, the Borg would be pretty stupid if they decided to invade 24th century Earth then go back in time, rather than going back to the 21st century and attacking the then-relatively-defenceless Earth. We tend to forgive things like this because we care about the general story. So a mystery of how the Enterprise-E could see what should have been in another timeline is maybe just something we should sweep under the rug.

Picard seems to commit us to the idea that when you change something in the past, a new timeline is formed, branching away from the old one. But both timelines exist.

However, the entire show of Picard is based on the premise that the destruction of Romulus happened, Nero went back in time, but things are still going on in the timeline as if everything was normal. So, it looks like we might have to accept this notion of time travel (with possible exceptions for looping cases, like in Time’s Arrow, where a person’s going back in time doesn’t change anything, because they were there already). [Editor's note: for more on time travel where you don't change the past, see the discussion here]

So, to clarify, it looked like Star Trek was endorsing a model where you could overwrite what happens in the past, replacing it with new events. But Picard seems to commit us to the idea that when you change something in the past, a new timeline is formed, branching away from the old one. But both timelines exist (hence the events of Picard happening).

Moral Motivation

However, I really don’t like this model, largely because of what it means for moral motivation in loads of classic Star Trek. There have been a lot of episodes over the various series that have made use of time travel. In fact, there have been so many that you could rank a top 15. In most of these, something bad happens, and our heroes try to prevent it from happening. Or so we thought.

Meme with Janeway

For example, consider Endgame, the finale of Star Trek Voyager. We discover that Janeway did get Voyager home in 2394, but lost many of the crew along the way, including Seven of Nine. In 2404, Admiral Janeway gets her hands on some time travel technology and uses it to meet with Voyager back in 2378. With the help of 25th century technology, she is able to get the crew home earlier, motivated principally by her desire to save Seven of Nine.

The branching model – in which a new timeline is created, via time travel, in addition to the original - changes the situation. The timeline where Seven of Nine died presumably continues. Janeway no longer saves Seven, but creates a whole new one, and a whole new universe along with her! In the First Contact case, things look even weirder. Rather than Picard restoring the timeline, if both timelines exist regardless, what he’s actually doing is deciding what timeline he wants to live in. This is hardly the noble goal that it looked like before.

Another example features in The New Generation’s Firstborn. In that episode, a mysterious Klingon, K’mtar, comes aboard the Enterprise to help Worf and Alexander. We discover through the episode that K’mtar is actually a future version of Alexander, who, wracked with guilt for events that led to his father dying, tries to fix this. But, if the timeline he comes from will exist no matter what, he doesn’t really fix anything. His father did still die. Nothing is altered there.

This seems to get something wrong about the characters’ motives. Janeway wants to save Seven. And in First Contact, Picard wants to stop the Borg from having assimilated Earth. Yet under the new model, that’s not really what’s happened at all.

And it gets weirder

Maybe all of this doesn’t bother you. Perhaps this seems fine. And bringing a new timeline into existence that has certain features isn’t so bad.

But when we think about how this affects how we should live, things can start to look weirder. Lots of philosophers (just like normal people!) are interested in how we should live our lives. What makes it good to act one way, or another? What makes a certain way of living right or wrong? What is the good life (if there is such a thing)? A popular response to this is the consequentialist solution. For the consequentialist, what you should do is make the world better. In fact, consequentialists usually think that what we have to do, morally speaking, is make the world as good as we can. So, if you’ve got two options before you, and one of them makes the world better than the other, that’s the one you should pick. Usually, consequences happen after you act, but when we think about backwards time travel, this need not be the case.

And when we think about the consequences of Nero going back in time, if he creates a whole new timeline, in addition to the one that already existed, we’ve got a whole universe of extra things in our ontology (the things that exist). So, we might think that he made the world (or more accurately, the complete set of things that exist) better, even though he destroyed Vulcan!

Nero

The consequentialist is likely to think even weirder things than that, if we have this model of time travel. Because they think you should cause everything to be as good as possible, if we think two universes are better than one, it looks like they have to say you’re morally required to make more universes. So long as, in total, the extra universe you create by going back in time is on the whole a good thing, it seems like that’s what you have to do!

Maybe we don’t actually think the world is that great, but most people seem to think it’s at least a good thing that it exists rather than nothing. Gottfried Leibniz actually thought that the world we’re in is the best of all possible worlds.[3] If he’s right that we live in the best of all possible worlds, then even worlds close to ours would be pretty good, so we should make more of them!

Janeway no longer saves Seven, but creates a whole new one, and a whole new universe along with her!

And if I happen to have a time machine, and I think the universe is a good thing, it looks like I have an interesting choice ahead of me. I could try to continue in my current timeline, making it as happy as possible. Alternatively, I could go back in time and make a very tiny change. Perhaps one so insignificant that all the people in the new timeline will be pretty much exactly the same (maybe quantum events would take place differently?). This would in effect make the amount of happiness in this timeline since the branching point (and for the entire future ahead) happen twice. And I could keep doing this, sending grains of sand to very distant points in the universe fifty years ago, creating a new universe every time.

This strikes me as super weird. That in itself doesn’t give us any reason to believe it’s a bad model of time travel. But it does mean that whenever one of our heroes ‘goes back in time to fix things’, they’ve not fixed things at all. Instead, they’ve seen a timeline they don’t like and decided to leave and join a new one. This is hardly the exemplary behaviour I’ve come to expect from my protagonists!

Footnotes

[1] https://memory-alpha.fandom.com/wiki/Alternate_reality

[2] Star Trek: First Contact.

[3] Gottfried Leibniz, Monadology.


Further Reading

If you’re interested in learning more about what philosophers say about time travel, a great place to start is David Lewis, The Paradoxes of Time Travel, American Philosophical Quarterly Vol. 13 No. 2 (1976), pp. 145-152.

For more on consequentialism (outside of time travel questions), and why people find it plausible, it’s worth checking out the Internet Encylopedia of Philosophy entry. For more in-depth information on moral motivation, see the SEP entry.

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Guest <![CDATA[Game for Graduates]]> http://www.epicureancure.com/?p=290 2016-11-07T22:58:30Z 2016-09-14T22:09:50Z The use of video games in education is neither a new idea, nor one that has escaped ridicule. Indeed, the melding of education and entertainment has, in reality, been somewhat less ambitious – and less successful – than the early pioneers of so-called ‘edutainment’ (shudder) might have predicted. That’s not to say there haven’t been successful educational games but what I’m interested in exploring is whether commercial games, developed purely for entertainment purposes, might also possess educational benefits.

Screenshot from Team Fortress 2.

My work is inspired by the likes of James Paul Gee, Kurt Squire and the late Seymour Papert, and focuses primarily on difficult-to-teach transferable skills (sometimes referred to as ‘graduate attributes’ by universities such as mine) rather than the transfer of knowledge. These skills include communication, collaboration, adaptability, critical thinking and resourcefulness: skills which, I argue, are required in abundance in certain commercial video games.

There are significantly improved gains on the measures of communication, resourcefulness and adaptability for the game-playing group versus the control...

To test this idea, I recruited undergraduate students to take part in a study. Half the students were randomly assigned to a group that would take a battery of psychometric tests to measure their communication skill, adaptability and resourcefulness, then play selected video games for a semester and take the tests again. The other half were assigned to a control group, and asked only to take the tests at the beginning and end of the semester. The games played included multiplayer shooters such as Team Fortress 2 and Borderlands 2, recent indie hits Gone Home and Papers, Please, old-school strategy title Warcraft III, and the ubiquitous Minecraft. Participants played a minimum of two hours of each game before moving on to the next, and we were fortunate enough to have a dedicated computer lab on campus that students could drop into between classes.

3 students sit at computers in a lab, playing video games.

Looking at the test results from the beginning of the semester and the end, there are significantly improved gains on the measures of communication, resourcefulness and adaptability for the game-playing group versus the control (differences of between 0.9 and 1.15 standard deviations in test scores, stats fans!). 95% confidence intervals calculated for the difference between mean scores for the control and game-playing groups did not cross zero, suggesting that playing video games is beneficial to the wider student population.

Screenshot from Papers Please.

The study is currently being written up for publication, and I hope to collect more data to support these initial findings but, for now, those of us who have been playing these games for three decades or more can reasonably claim that it wasn’t such a terrible waste of time after all…


If you have questions or comments, drop us a line below, or find Matt on twitter.

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Guest <![CDATA[Kazuo Ishiguro, The Buried Giant]]> http://www.epicureancure.com/?p=242 2016-11-07T23:03:09Z 2016-08-31T21:49:32Z Different readers have had different experiences of The Buried Giant (2015), some finding it too crude an allegory, others enraged by its refusal to tell a straight story, still others engrossed and moved by its account of married love and the slow re-emergence of a half-forgotten atrocity. That, of course, is the point of the novel. It’s not a single story but a set of competing versions of the past, like Kurosawa’s great movie Rashomon (1950), and the great set pieces of the book are ones where all the characters talk at cross purposes, their readings of events utterly and often comically at odds with one another, their belief systems incompatible. Even individuals question their own version of events, thanks to the mist of selective amnesia that provides the novel with its plot and central metaphor: they are unable to be sure whether what they believe now is in any way related to their past commitments, and claim ignorance as to whether or not they have betrayed their comrades, allies, loved ones or ideals at some point in their former lives, however certain they claim to be of their faiths and loyalties here and now. They are not even altogether sure that they have forgotten things – a situation that caused particular anxiety to James Woods, the book’s reviewer for the New Yorker. Woods expressed consternation that their amnesia is itself unreliable, and that at times they seem able to recover with ease memories they claim to have lost for ever only moments previously. But to complain that this situation doesn’t make for what you generally assume to be a satisfactory story is, I think, to fail altogether to understand what Ishiguro is doing to the notions of ‘story’, ‘history’, ‘myth’ and ‘fantasy’ in this most disturbing and touching of narratives.

Toshiro Mifune and Machiko Kyo in Kurosawa’s Rashomon (1950)

Everyone who’s read anything about the novel will know that it had a long and tortuous genesis. Ishiguro came up with the plot, he tells us, at an early stage, but took some time to settle in his mind whether to set it in Japan or Britain; it was a reading of that most ironic of Arthurian romances, Sir Gawain and the Green Knight, that helped him make up his mind. He wrote a first draft which was dismissed by his wife as a failure because of its lavish prose style; he then wrote a second in a completely different register. The novel once completed, he was worried that his more serious-minded readers would dismiss it as ‘fantasy’. All these things work in its favour, to my mind. The book imports the traumatic experience of Japanese history – and the way this has been represented in art, especially film – into the Matter of Britain. Everyone knows about the multiple traumas and atrocities buried in Japan’s past, but the British have been more assiduous in burying theirs, from massacres in Ireland and India to the invention of concentration camps in the Boer War. This book invites us to exhume them, by revising that most cherished of British myths, the story of Arthur, who is supposed to have united a divided Britain by humane means – though even Malory ascribed to him an imperialist impulse that took him on the rampage through France and Italy to Rome. The novel ironizes romance and heroism as vigorously as Gawain or Beowulf. Its prose style is deeply strange. And its uneasy deployment of the tropes of fantasy invites its readers, whether or not they are well versed in them, to reconsider their function in literature and culture past and present. I think we’ll look back on it as a major achievement, and one that speaks to the many revisions of myth that have been going on in recent decades.

[I]ts uneasy deployment of the tropes of fantasy invites its readers... to reconsider their function in literature and culture past and present.

The book is as full of echoes as Shakespeare’s island in The Tempest. It begins in a grimmer version of a hobbit hole: a village of gloomy burrows, whose apparently genial communitarianism masks a propensity for bullying the weak which turns out to be a trait of just about everyone we meet in the story (the old couple we meet in the first pages have recently been robbed of their only candle, for no apparent reason, so that they have to live for the most part in the dark). A later incident, in which a Saxon warrior kills two ravaging ogres, recalls Beowulf’s killing of Grendel and his mother, while a visit to a monastery summons up the grotesquerie and ingenious misdirections of Umberto Eco’s Name of the Rose. The Greek ferryman of the dead, Charon, crops up repeatedly, and talks about taking passengers across to an island that sounds much like Avalon. One of the most fascinating figures in the book, from the point of view of his literary ancestry, is the knight Sir Gawain. His abnormal height, his advanced age and his thinness might make us think of Don Quixote drawn by Honoré Daumier, as does his apparent confusion over which remarks directed at him he should take offence at and which he should embrace as well-deserved compliments on his outmoded fidelity to a long-lost ideal. His clumsiness, his solitude, his white hair, his initial appearance in a wood of forgetfulness, his bouts of yearning after inaccessible young girls, might bring to mind the White Knight in Through the Looking Glass, who is also a figure of his creator Lewis Carroll. His fighting technique, like that of the Saxon warrior, is pure Samurai – a single well-aimed, deadly stroke is his preferred method of dispatching opponents (think of Kyuzo’s terrifying efficiency in Seven Samurai, or Zatoichi’s in Takeshi Kitano’s version). The mysterious widows who torment him with reminders of his past dark deeds recall the ghostly old women of Japanese tradition, such as the witch in Kurosawa’s Throne of Blood or the periodic apparitions in Satoshi Kon’s Millennium Actress. Beckett is present in much of the action, as is The Blair Witch Project, Hirokazu Koreeda’s After Life and Shakespeare’s King Lear. Echoes of films, books, poems (the name Beatrice summons up Dante’s Divine Comedy) tug at the reader’s memory at every turn, exacerbating the sense that past and future tragedies are always on the verge of re-emerging from obscurity as the story unfolds. And the overlapping of these different narratives and traditions reinforce too our sense that no story is singular – all are interwoven, and every reader will trace a different set of influences through the novel, all of them subverted by Ishiguro’s ironic tone.

The Pale Man from Pan's Labyrinth

When I say that characters in Ishiguro’s book – like his readers – read each incident differently, it should be stressed that this extends itself to the objects and creatures they see or which they signally fail to notice. Over and over again what they see differs: above all when it involves the supernatural or fantastic. The central characters, Axl and Beatrice, have poor eyesight, and often mistake things seen at a distance. For them the arm of an ogre, yanked off by the Saxon warrior Wistan, looks at first like an eyeless head, something like the Pale Man’s in Pan’s Labyrinth: ‘where the eyes, nose and mouth should have been there was only pimpled flesh, like that of a goose, with a few tufts of down-like hair on its cheeks’ (75-6). Only later does Axl realize that what he is looking at is not a head at all, ‘but a section of the shoulder and upper arm of some abnormally large, human-like creature’. Later, on an underground journey that recalls the visits of epic heroes to the Shades, Axl sees by candlelight the body of a dead bat where Beatrice sees the corpse of an abandoned baby. Axl entirely fails to spot the moment when Gawain slays the monster that lurks in this subterranean maze – he sees it run on after its death stroke but does not notice it has lost its head. Later still, Beatrice sees a distant row of soldiers in the mountains, which Axl takes for birds and the aged knight Sir Gawain for the tormenting widows who follow him everywhere. Looking down into a ditch, it takes Axl several minutes to distinguish the corpse of a goat from the body of the dying ogre that has been eating it: ‘Only then did he see that much of what initially he had taken to be of the dead goat belonged to a second creature entangled with it. That mound there was a shoulder; that a stiffened knee’ (288). Here again an ogre is presented to us as dismembered, but on this occasion its predicament elicits sympathy: Axl calls it ‘some poor ogre […] dying a slow death’ (289). Earlier, the boy Edwin saw three more seemingly dismembered ogres by a pond in a wood, one of them ‘crouching down on its knees and elbows at the water’s very edge, its head completely submerged’, so that ‘To a careless observer, [it] might have been a headless corpse’ (272). He too feels pity for them, as if his earlier abduction by ogres had given him an insight into their perspective, rendering them ‘human-like’ rather than monstrous. Meanwhile the warrior Wistan sees the partly submerged monsters by the pond as ancient trees, attributing Edwin’s view of them to a bout of delirium. Seeing things with distorted vision is, in fact, not just possible but highly likely in Ishiguro’s Britain – partly because of the physical condition of the land’s inhabitants. There are no corrective lenses for Axl’s eyes; Beatrice suffers from some nameless and possibly terminal affliction; Edwin has been wounded (though again, no one has a clear idea what by – a dragon, a cockatrice, an ogre?); Wistan is in a fever from wounds sustained in battle. As in Ishiguro’s previous novel, Never Let Me Go (2005), physical pain is a constant presence in the book’s landscape, serving to locate the appalling damage inflicted by tyranny and random violence in the inner organs of still-living victims. Everyone is journeying to a slow death, carrying mementoes of their mortality in their chests and bellies and sides, no matter how hard they seek to defend their minds from an awareness of its imminent approach.

The land partakes of the body’s sickness. The earth is full of slaughtered corpses, from the buried giant of the title to the remains of Saxon civilians slaughtered by Arthur’s knights in his final battle – no longer the heroic act of self sacrifice it was for Malory but a savage breach of promise, the deliberate violation of a carefully negotiated truce between enemies. Sir Gawain is reluctant to be buried anywhere but on top of a mountain for fear of the vengeful dead he might share the soil with. The Stygian tunnel through which Gawain, Edwin and the elderly couple travel is floored with bones. Christianity is less a religion than a means of distinguishing the Britons from the pagan Saxons; the Christians in the book have little confidence in God’s mercy, subjecting themselves to appalling torment as a means of anticipating the punishment he might mete out after their deaths, and only the pagan afterlife left behind by the departed Romans has any substance, manifesting itself in the ubiquitous figure of the ferryman. The land of chivalric romance is notoriously featureless, unlike the secondary worlds of epic fantasy, which are invariably given shape and substance by an accompanying map. Ishiguro’s Britain is closer to the former, with few names assigned to communities or features of the landscape – there’s a brief mention of Badon Hill at one point, but one cannot imagine a map being drawn of the land where it would feature. Place has come detached from place like the limbs of the ogre emerging from the mud in the ditch, entangled with the limbs of a goat.

Communities, too, have come apart in Ishiguro’s Britain. Families have been separated: Axl and Beatrice set out on their travels in a bid to find a son they may have driven off, or who may never have existed, and on their journey they encounter many more children who have been neglected, forgotten or betrayed. A little girl called Marta causes consternation in her village when she stays out after sunset; but before long the community gets distracted by something else, and by the time she gets safely home they have half forgotten she was ever missing. The boy Edwin seems at first to have a loving family, since his uncles muster the courage to attempt his rescue when he is abducted by ogres, but his relatives quickly turn on him when they think he has been infected by a vampiric bite from one of his abductors. Much later, Axl and Beatrice meet a young girl who has been abandoned by her parents, and who defends her younger brothers against another marauding ogre. The young generation have, in fact, become thoroughly at home in the cruel world they inhabit, and this acclimatization is part of what separates them from their elders. At one point the boy Edwin remembers meeting a teenage girl who has been tied up by her fellow travellers for their gratification. She is not particularly outraged by what has been done to her, and later when Edwin is in turn tied up and used as bait to attract the dragon he too takes it in his stride, expecting nothing better even from Wistan, the man he most admires. The little girl Marta is confident she will not get in trouble when she goes wandering, since she knows full well that her family will soon lose interest in looking for her, and like Edwin she can manage ogres: ‘I know how to hide from them,’ she tells Axl cheerfully (12). She shares, in fact, the attitude of Ishiguro’s narrator to monsters, as expressed in the opening pages: ‘One had to accept that every so often […] an ogre might carry off a child into the mist. The people of the day had to be philosophical about such outrages’ (3-4). Ogres are part of her community, like the humans who fear them, and both (as Edwin has learned long before we meet him in the narrative) can be equally deadly.

Each sacrifice – of oneself, of one’s enemies, of one’s children, parents or partner – triggers further bloodshed...

The most broken community in the novel is an isolated monastery in the mountains which occupies the site of a genocidal massacre. Religious communities are places of peace and contemplation, but Ishiguro goes to great pains (the phrase is apt) to show how they are also embedded in the landscape as well as the history of atrocity. His monastery is an elaborate physical and mental trap: Axl and Beatrice go there to get medical help for Beatrice’s ailment, but are betrayed by one of the monks into entering a monster’s lair, where he hopes they will be killed and eaten, and it’s implied that this happens regularly to the monks’ guests. The healer-monk whose advice they seek is himself dying from self-inflicted injuries sustained in penance for Arthur’s massacre of the Saxons. The monastery is an old Saxon fort which has been seized and turned to new uses by its British conquerors. The fort was designed not so much to protect the Saxons as to destroy the Britons in their moment of victory – like the young girl’s poisoned goat which kills the ogre even as the monster devours it. There are left-over booby traps in the repurposed fort, one of which is activated in an act of vengeance by the Saxon warrior Wistan; but the site itself seems to be destructive by virtue of its genocidal history, working on the consciences of its religious inhabitants until they subject themselves to Christ-like excruciations in a desperate bid to save their souls. In fact, as the novel goes on the imagery of sacrifice and betrayal proliferates in it, becoming in the end a pastiche of the Christian sacrifice to which the monks are ostensibly committed. Each sacrifice – of oneself, of one’s enemies, of one’s children, parents or partner – triggers further bloodshed, in a vicious cycle that predicts the continuing cycle of history from the so-called Dark Ages to the present.

Kazuo Ishiguro, holding the Buried Giant

My account of the book makes it sound unrelievedly grim, but it really isn’t, and this is largely thanks to the sometimes comic detachment of its style – a detachment that reinforces the sense that its characters can endure the monstrousness of their Dark Age situation precisely because of their wilful removal of themselves from the stark realities of past and present. Axl and Beatrice, Wistan, Gawain and the boy Edwin converse in an awkward succession of stilted politenesses, even when they are drastically at odds with one another; Axl calls his wife ‘princess’, and treats her like one, constantly striving to protect her from the pain and exhaustion their journey brings her, acquiescing to all her proposals even when they distress or hurt him. Wistan expresses unwavering hatred for the Britons who massacred his people and seeks to bequeath this hatred to young Edwin, his fellow Saxon; but he treats the Britons Axl and Beatrice with affection and respect, and behaves with ridiculous courtesy to Gawain even at the point when they’re about to spill each other’s guts. Edwin promises to hate all Britons when Wistan asks him to, but he clearly can’t see the point in it; the elderly British couple are his friends and so must be exempted from the blanket injunction, and if them, how many others? People, like ogres, can be liked and pitied even by those who seek their deaths – the young girl who poisons the ogre with her goat is afterwards sorry for what she has done and claims she didn’t intend it. Even the dragon is a pitiable creature, worn out by its hard life like Axl, Beatrice and Gawain; it must be killed, but it is also a victim, forced into spreading oblivion across the land by Merlin’s spells, and its would-be killers feel no resentment as they approach its ailing body to lop off its head. The elaborate verbal courtesy, then, that people extend to one another in Ishiguro’s Britain is not just a means to cover up their true feelings (whatever these may be – the novel suggests that human feelings are always conflicted). It also serves to manifest their genuine affection for one another despite all the cultural and historical pressures that combine to drive them apart. Courtesy endures even after the stark realities of the past have been unveiled thanks to the dragon’s death, and it’s this courtesy, like the unfailing courtesy of Gawain in the Green Knight, that one remembers afterwards, rendered all the more poignant by the savage setting in which it somehow survives.

The chief characteristic of the book’s style – especially the dialogue – is that it reads like a work in translation. It is clear and spare, stripped of rhetorical flourish and colloquial punchiness, and stripped too of dialectal elements specific to a certain class or locale or historical period – in marked contrast to the language of, say, Sir Gawain and the Green Knight, or the Wakefield cycle, or Morris, or Tolkien. I was reminded as I read of the translations of Homer and Ovid I read as a child in the continuous prose of the Penguin Classics series, largely composed by its founder, the poet and scholar E V Rieu: a prose which reminded you at every moment that what you were encountering was at several removes from the original, yet which also miraculously seemed to convey certain crucial elements of that original in heroic defiance of the mists of time. Here is Ishiguro’s version of Rieu, in a passage from near the beginning where the elderly couple are striving to remember their departed son:

‘Some days I remember him clear enough,’ she said. ‘Then the next day it’s as if a veil’s fallen over his memory. But our son’s a fine and good man, I know that for sure.’

‘Why is he not with us here now, princess?’

‘I don’t know, Axel. It could be he quarreled with the elders and had to leave. I’ve asked around and there’s no one here remembers him. But he wouldn’t have done anything to bring shame on himself, I know for sure. Can you remember nothing of it yourself, Axl?’

‘When I was outside just now, doing my best to remember all I could in the stillness, many things came back to me. But I can’t remember our son, neither his face nor his voice, though sometimes I think I can see him when he was a small boy, and I’m leading him by the hand beside the riverbank, or when he was weeping one time and I was reaching out to comfort him. But what he looks like today, where he’s living, if he has a son of his own, I don’t remember at all. I was hoping you’d remember more, princess.’

‘He’s our son,’ Beatrice said. ‘So I can feel things about him, even when I don’t remember clearly. And I know he longs for us to leave this place and be living with him under his protection.’ (28-9)

The language here is formal, for all its occasional gestures towards the demotic (the contraction of ‘has’ in ‘as if a veil’s fallen across his memory’ is a classic bit of rather stiff translator’s colloquialism). There is no attempt at a lyrical rhythm. The vocabulary is simple and clear, as if selected by an adherent of the Campaign for Plain English – or deployed in a classroom by a teacher keen to ensure her charges can readily follow her words. Beatrice speaks of her son in platitudes: ‘our son’s a fine and good man, I know that for sure’, she tells Axl, awkwardly but confidently combining a claim to certainty (‘for sure’) with the vaguest of epithets (‘a fine and good man’), and she does the same twice more in this short passage: ‘he wouldn’t have done anything to bring shame on himself, I know for sure’; ‘He’s our son […] so I can feel things about him […] And I know he longs for us to leave this place’. Axl, meanwhile, remembers only gestures, detached from the markers of individuality, face and voice – the ‘things’ Beatrice repeatedly refers to. Both of them, then, represent their son in what are effectively verbal fragments, like the fragments of the ogre in the ditch. The most translation-like feature of the passage, perhaps, is its frequent use of the present continuous – a tense not so very often used in colloquial English: ‘sometimes […] I’m leading him by the hand […] or when he was weeping one time and I was reaching out to comfort him […] he longs for us to […] be living with him under his protection’. The overall effect is to suggest that Axl and Beatrice are constructing their son not from memories or instincts – however tenuous – but from what their culture generally assumes a good parent would think about his or her offspring: that he is ‘fine and good’, that he would never misbehave, that he wants them to be with him as a good son should. The continuous present indicates that their thoughts about him are not bound by time, as memories are, but permanent features of their mental landscape. Their courteous attitude to one another’s perspective (‘Can you remember nothing of it yourself, Axl?’ […] ‘I was hoping you’d remember more, princess’), suggests that they are keener to achieve consensus than to draw attention to some striking recollection of their own that might clash with their spouse’s. Axl and Beatrice are dedicated to holding things together, and the strange translator’s English they speak, treading a tightrope walker’s path between abysses of contention and contradiction, is their sole defence against the imminent collapse of all agreements among the inhabitants of the damaged Britain they wander.

White Knight and Alice, from Alice through the Looking Glass

At various points in the book the consensual translator’s language shows clear signs of the intense strain to which it’s being subjected by the old enmities, buried atrocities and conflicting emotions and loyalties it conceals. Sir Gawain, in particular, sometimes lapses into incoherence as he seeks to sustain his image as the solitary warrior dedicated to preserving his idealized monarch’s vision of universal peace at the cost of personal relationships:

I had a duty. Ha! And do I fear him now? Never, sir, never. I accuse you of nothing. That great law you brokered torn down in blood! Yet it held well for a time. Torn down in blood! Who blames us for it now? Do I fear youth? Is it youth alone can defeat an opponent? Let him come, let him come. Remember it, sir! (309)

The collapse of distinctions here – it’s hard to tell which ‘him’ or ‘you’ or ‘us’ is referred to in successive sentences – has the effect of conflating all the characters in the book, making them all equally the guilty parties and the victims of the cycle of violence in which they are caught. In this it replicates the way implements make their way from one person’s hands to another in Ishiguro’s novel. One hoe in particular – a farming tool consisting of a long pole with a downturned blade at one end – is at one point to be found in the hands of a young girl, who uses it to exact an appalling vengeance on the man who raped or murdered her mother and sisters (241): a vengeance so terrible that it shocks Sir Gawain and violates his sense of the girl as an innocent victim. Later in the book an identical hoe is seized by Axl as he fights to defend Beatrice against a swarm of pixies, tiny malevolent beings whose disturbing resemblance to young children serves utterly to compromise Axl’s apparent act of chivalry (263). The hoe, like the plain language used by Ishiguro’s characters, is no more than a tool, but the second time we encounter it this instrument has been contaminated by the previous encounter – hoes have become instruments of appalling sadism, and this association is impossible to shake off as Axl attacks the swarm of creatures whose ‘collective voices seemed to him to resemble the sound of children playing in the distance’ (263). At this point Axl, like the girl, is no longer identifiable as simply criminal or victim, aggressor or defender against aggression. The language of Gawain’s speech extends this moral confusion to everyone else in the novel – Wistan, Axl, Gawain, Edwin, the long-dead Arthur, and the young people (like the hoe-wielding girl) who can so readily accommodate themselves to the violent world King Arthur bequeathed to them. All have been cross-infected by association with atrocities, just as the boy Edwin was deemed to have been rendered ogreish by the bite he sustained from an ogre. I, you, we, he, she, they – all pronouns are in a similar position, interchangeable in any given sentence relating to guilt, shame, pain or sudden aggression.

[H]e leaves his sympathetic readers with little doubt of...the capacity of fantasy to represent the pain involved both in sustaining and dissipating the mists of illusion.

The one exception may be Axl’s wife Beatrice – though even she is to some extent compromised in Axl’s mind by one highly unreliable memory that surfaces towards the end of the narrative. Beatrice’s mission throughout is to recover the memories obscured by the mist, first by visiting her lost son and later by helping slay the dragon who gave rise to the mist of forgetfulness. Her conviction that Axl and she have nothing to fear from the return of memory is always touching, but the trajectory of the story tends to expose it as a comforting dream or fantasy, sprung from the fund of comforting fantasies by which people preserve their sense of order, love and justice. I suspect this is one of the reasons Ishiguro turned to fantasy in this novel: as a means of exploring the quotidian fantasies we cling to – chief of all, perhaps, the fantasy that we live in a civilized epoch, firmly founded on previous epochs of civilization – which are aided and abetted by the patterns of our everyday discourse.

The final chapter draws out this theme with consummate skill. Throughout the novel points of view have shifted from time to time – we see things successively from Axl’s, Edwin’s and Sir Gawain’s perspectives – but this is the first time we have been invited to see an episode from the perspective of a fourth individual – one of the Charon-like boatmen who have cropped up periodically since soon after the beginning of the narrative. It’s also the first time we have been given a first person narrator – apart from the anonymous first person narrator of the first chapter (are we meant to believe, then, that this is the boatman, that we are being addressed throughout the book by the ferryman of the dead?). In the last chapter, the elderly couple finally seem to be approaching the moment of their journey that Beatrice, in particular, has anticipated from the beginning, when they will be reunited with their long lost son. Beatrice is convinced the happy ending will soon take place and that the three of them will be permitted to cross to the island where her son lives and inhabit it for ever in blissful unity. The boatman’s perspective, however, gives us access to his intentions, which increasingly suggest that her hopes are misguided. His narrative is filled with expressions of pity for the couple, as if he is convinced they will soon be permanently parted – and that there’s nothing he can do about it, in spite of his agency in parting them. ‘I cannot lie and I have my duty’, he says at one point (348) as he directs them to the shack where their passage to the island on his boat will be arranged (in this book the island is a topographical emblem of isolation, as in Donne’s celebrate sermon – though Beatrice sees it as a site of recovery like the Avalon of Arthurian legend). The word ‘duty’ used here by the boatman has by this time been contaminated by Sir Gawain’s repeated use of it to denote the dubious responsibilities he was assigned by Ishiguro’s demythologized Arthur.

Oil painting - Charon and Psyche

Axl, meanwhile, becomes increasingly – and as the reader know, rightly – suspicious of the boatman’s intentions, but continues to sustain Beatrice in her fantasy of a joyful conclusion to their adventures. Beatrice speaks of the boatman’s kindness with conviction, as she did of her son in the earlier passage: ‘He’s a good man and won’t let us down’ (360). Axl does not believe it – he has caught the boatman in one lie at least and is certain all his other promises too are lies; yet he chooses not to puncture his exhausted wife’s last dream; and to the last moment they spend together he sustains her fantasy, although he does not share it. The book ends with the old woman happy in her conviction that her future will be a loving one, and the old man wandering away from her, lonely in the dark.

The reader is left wondering which condition is better: Beatrice’s knowledge, which is really ignorance, or Axl’s, which the reader knows to be well founded. The question is not an easy one to answer. Beatrice leaves with the boatman, certain she will be reunited with Axl and her on on the other side. Axl leaves alone, certain that he has given his wife – at least for a time – the happy ending she longed for, in the only way available to him. His own unhappiness is assured – but so too is her happiness, however long it lasts. Axl asks a similar question of Beatrice not long before they part: ‘Could it be our love would never have grown so strong down the years had the mist not robbed us the way it did? Perhaps it allowed old wounds to heal’ (361). In the end he believes, as he has done since the beginning, that it is best to leave the mist of illusion in place – ironically enough, since it was the ignorant Beatrice who always insisted that it is better to remember every detail of a relationship than to lose even a single memory to time, however painful. Ishiguro leaves us to judge for ourselves which of these two perspectives we share. One thing, however, he leaves his sympathetic readers with little doubt of: the capacity of fantasy to represent the pain involved both in sustaining and dissipating the mists of illusion.

He also leaves us with a memory: that of the only true act of self-sacrifice in the novel. I said earlier that every sacrifice in the book triggers further bloodshed. From what we can see, this is not true of Axl’s – though it’s also not clear how far he had a choice in making his sacrifice, since the sense of its having been somehow predestined has been implanted in the reader by our earlier encounters with the boatman. Then again, the one event in all our lives which is predestined is the fact of death, and the parting with loved ones this entails – a parting considered in many religions to extend into the afterlife, where there will be no marriage or giving in marriage, as the Bible tells us. Axl’s parting from his wife, then, is both the most painful moment in the book and the most movingly memorable.

For me this makes it a moment of light in Ishiguro’s meditation on Dark Age darkness; though it’s a fading light, like the ‘low sun on the cove’ to which Axl moves in the final sentence. We should be grateful for it.


You can find more of Rob's eloquent reviews, as well as short stories and other delights, at the City of Lost Books.

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Guest <![CDATA[Winning Entry: Universal Non-Translation]]> http://www.epicureancure.com/?p=237 2017-08-11T21:03:12Z 2016-08-26T22:04:10Z You descended into the water for Session 14. [Fæfǁǁ^fɔ:] was waiting already, long fern-like tail gently swishing in the current. It wasn't like in fiction. There was no handy coms badge to translate for you, no tiny fish in your ear even.

This was less the first contact of the movies and more like that time you had tried to learn Welsh in night school. Surprisingly, those Welsh lessons were proving helpful. In a way. Sort of. At least you were already used to flailing wildly at a new language.

You were however, relieved that the [Swǁ_ɪɪɪ] favoured shallower waters and you didn't have to descend into a deep sea trench for each meeting. You had established so far that there were at least 6 and no more than 12 of the aquatic visitors. Counting was difficult when one used fingers and the other ... something else. Either fin ripples or a series of small nodules behind their eyes. It hadn't been completely clear.

Today though, two weeks after your first meeting, you were going to ascertain where they had come from. And how. You had asked before of course. It had been one of first questions the MI5 divers had asked after the Department of Fisheries had raised the query and a team had been sent to intercept.

It turned out, that while MI5 had divers and protocols for first contact they hadn't considered that these two needs would intersect. They hadn't anticipated language either.

So that's why you were called in. A linguistics consultant, who happened to have diving certification. Hurriedly given confidentiality papers to sign, a crash course in procedure and sent to the Irish Sea. To meet them.

The newcomers.

The [Swǁ_ɪɪɪ].


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